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THE POLITICS OF CANCER.* By Samuel S. Epstein. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 1978. Pp. 583. $12.50.
If one thousand people died every day of cholera, swine flu, or food

poisoning, an epidemic of major proportions would be at hand and
the entire country would mobilize against it. Yet cancer claims
that many lives daily, often in prolonged and agonizing pain, and
most people believe they can do nothing about it. . . .
But cancer has distinct, identifiable causes. . . . It can
largely be prevented, but this requires more than just scientific
effort or individual action. The control and prevention of cancer
will require a concerted national effort. This book is offered as a
contribution to that essentially political process. [P. l]

With these opening words, Dr. Epstein sets forth the themes
of The Politics of Cancer. Cancer is largely a man-made (read,
industry-made) epidemic, and thus can be prevented by man.
But the public does not know that cancer is preventable, industry
resists reform and manipulates facts and fears, and the epidemic
continues. Because much of the battle against that epidemic is
being fought in legal forums, its saga, and therefore this book, is
of special concern to lawyers.
The Politics of Cancer has three major parts. Part I, "The
Science of Cancer," explains the basic scientific methods of determining whether a substance is carcinogenic. One method is
epidemiological study, the statistical search for "characteristics
common to those contracting" cancer (p. 38). Such studies have
the advantage of being "as close as we can reasonably get to
performing actual experiments on humans" (p. 38), but it is difficult to gather data on enough victims of a particular type of
cancer to draw meaningful conclusions. A single type of cancer
strikes only a small proportion of the population, and a long
period usually separates contact with the carcinogen and the
onset of the disease. Another difficulty with this method is
"sorting out the relevant from the irrelevant" (p. 41). Sometimes
there are synergistic effects between two factors, and at other
times a harmless factor merely coincides with a carcinogen. The
asbestos industry, for example, has argued that epidemiological
studies show only that smoking and contact with asbestos together, but not that contact with asbestos alone, cause cancer.
The second method of determining carcinogenicity is to test
the suspect substance on animals. This method has the advantage of enabling researchers to use precise controls. Its major
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Reuiew.
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difficulty is that researchers must jump from a conclusion of carcinogenicity in animals to one of carcinogenicity in humans. This
"species-to-species extrapolation" (p. 57) has been repeatedly
challenged by industry, but Epstein avers, with citations, that
"[t]his inference rests on over half a century of intensive scien-.
tific investigation into the biology and chemistry of carcinogenesis and carcinogens in many organisms, including humans" (p.
57). A second difficulty with animal tests is that many people
misunderstand the reasons for giving animals large doses. "The
superficial absurdity of a rat consuming the human equivalent of
about a thousand cans of diet soda per day . . . has been exploited by industry, misinterpreted by the press, and misunderstood by the lay public, which has come to believe that anything
given in large enough doses will cause cancer in animals. This
simply is not true" (pp. 64-65). Epstein explains that high doses
are needed because "(1) . . . some carcinogens are much less
potent than others and (2) . . . animal experiments, no matter
how well planned, must make use of finite animal resources" (p.
65). These difficulties do not mean that inferring carcinogenicity
from animal studies is improper, but they do make it impossible
to predict from animal data a safe level of human contact. If a
substance is carcinogenic, the only level known to be safe is no
contact at all.
In Part II, "The Science and Politics of Cancer," Epstei_n
details twelve "case studies" of various carcinogens. These studies compose the heart of the book not only because they consume
over half the textual pages, but also because the more general
discussions in Parts I and ill draw heavily on them. Each study
recites how the basic scientific evidence of carcinogenicity was
obtained, how industry attempted to suppress or rebut that evidence, and how the government responded to the pressures of
workers, consumers, industry, or public-interest groups. Epstein
investigates four carcinogens that exist primarily in the workplace: asbestos, vinyl chloride (a major chemical in the production of plastics), benzene (used to manufacture tires and many
other products), and bischloromethylether (used in water purification and nuclear fuel fabrication). He also examines five carcinogens that appear in consumer products: tobacco, red dyes #2
and #40, saccharin, acrylonitrile (found in plastic bottles) and
female sex hormones (used in contraceptives, for gynecological
problems, and as an additive to animal feed). Finally, he reviews
three carcinogens present in the general environment: aldrin/
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dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor (both pesticides) and nitrosamines (an extensive group of chemicals found in air, food, and
water).
A typical case study is that of vinyl chloride. Epstein briefly
explains how polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is made from vinyl chloride, a process that leaves some unreacted vinyl chloride in the
polyvinyl-chloride resin. Those tens of thousands of workers who
subsequently handle the plastips can be exposed to this trapped
vinyl chloride as the PVC is heated or dissolved. Epstein traces
the industry's reaction to evidence that vinyl chloride might be
carcinogenic. In 1970, an Italian researcher reported, at an international cancer congress, that rats exposed to vinyl chloride developed a wide range of cancers. Disturbed by the report, a consortium of European chemical companies financed a further
study by another Italian researcher who confirmed the earlier
results and showed vinyl chloride to be a potent carcinogen. In
January 1973, the major trade association for the United States
chemical industry learned of the study's results, but only after
agreeing not to disclose them without the consortium's consent.
During that year, the association participated in proceedings with
both the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) about
the safety of vinyl chloride, but it never disclosed the Italian
results to either agency. Not until 1974, when B.F. Goodrich announced the cancer-induced deaths of three of its PVC workers,
did the association reveal, on the same day as the Goodrich announcement, the findings of the Italian study, now eighteen
months old.
As the danger became apparent, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) reduced the permissible concentration of vinyl chloride in the workplace from 500 parts per
million to 50 parts per million, and later to 1 part per million. The
chemical industry continue~ to distort data on the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride {p. 104). It also protested that the OSHA
standards were prohibitively expensive, and it commissioned
studies, which predicted increased costs of up to ninety billion
dollars, to support its claims. OSHA refused to back down, and
within a year the companies had, with only minimal difficulties,
complied with the standard. This kind of distortion by affected
industries is, regrettably, typical of that found in each of Epstein's case studies, although in many cases industry enjoys more
success in obtaining lax standards.
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In Part ill, "The Politics of Cancer," Epstein describes the
major organizations that shape cancer policy. He first works
through the tangled thicket of relationships among the innumerable government agencies: the major research agencies (the National Cancer Institute, the National Institutes of Health,
NIOSH, the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, the National Center for Toxicological Research, the Energy
Research and Development Administration, the Council on Environmental Quality) and the major regulatory agencies (OSHA,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the
FDA, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Bureau of Mines).
He analyzes some of the agencies' budgets, describes their conflicting goals and procedures, lists major agency regulations, and
sketches possible reforms (some of which are described below).
In the next chapter, Epstein unabashedly criticizes industry
for "fail[ing] to adequately comprehend the magnitude of health
and safety problems entailed in the manufacture and handling of
hazardous, particularly toxic or carcinogenic, chemicals" (p.
389). Drawing generalizations from the case studies of Part II,
Epstein summarizes the industrial "strategies" used to support
the status quo: By controlling information and propagandizing
the public, industry discounts the hazards of its products and
shifts the blame from the chemicals to "hypersusceptible" victims (p. 395). Industry attempts to influence policy through
lobbying and to exhaust the agencies through protracted legal
actions and by insisting on impossible precision in carcinogenesis
tests. Finally, if it finds regulations too strict, industry threatens
to move overseas or to southern states, where standards are more
lenient.
Epstein closes the chapter with briefer descriptions of labor's
efforts to secure healthier working conditions, the public-interest
movement's efforts to prod government to regulate carcinogens
more strictly, and the often admirable American Cancer Society's
indifference, if not hostility "to regulatory needs ... in the general environment and workplace" (p. 426). He concludes with a
chapter entitled "What You Can Do to Prevent Cancer."
Of the many innovative ideas in The Politics of Cancer, four
themes have particularly interesting policy overtones. First, Epstein calls for a reorganization of the diverse government agencies
and programs. For example, he proposes that the National Cancer Institute be insulated from direct presidential influence by
restoring it to the administrative control of the National Insti-
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tutes of Health, and he suggests that the political visibility of
NIOSH (whose work Epstein praises) be increased by allowing
it to report directly to the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW). The Carter administration is already attempting to coordinate the agencies better by forming an Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group representing the EPA, the OSHA, the
FDA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission and by
establishing the EPA Toxic Substances Strategy Committee,
which reports directly to the President. Epstein applauds such
attempts, and he urges even greater coordination among agencies.
A second idea of Epstein's addresses a more specific disadvantage of inefficient regulatory procedures. Whenever an agency
proposes to regulate an alleged carcinogen, major battles are
fought over what constitutes adequate proof of carcinogenicity. If
the agencies could all endorse a set of general scientific principles,
the regulatory process would be more efficient. Epstein vividly
depicts the wasted effort of duplicate hearings by recounting the
EPA proceedings to ban the pesticides aldrin/dieldrin and, later,
chlordane/heptachlor. In the first action, the EPA counsel formulated nine general principles of cancer research, including the
principles that a chemical's capacity to induce benign or malignant tumors should suffice to characterize it as a carcinogen; that
the concept of a safe "threshold" exposure level has no practical
significance; and that a carcinogenic agent can be identified by
animal tests or properly conducted epidemiological studies. According to Epstein, the administrative law judge and the reviewing EPA administrator implicitly incorporated those nine principles in the decision to suspend aldrin/dieldrin. Nevertheless,
when the hearings on chlordane/heptachlor began, the principles
again became "the salient point of contention" (p. 267). Such
repetitious debates over basic scientific principles in every individual hearing waste time and money. If generally-agreed-upon
principles were developed (perhaps through agency rule-making,
although Epstein suggests no specific procedure), individual
hearings could concentrate on, and presumably determine more
quickly, the carcinogenicity of the chemical in question.
Third, Epstein proposes that government and private researchers more strongly emphasize the prevention of cancer. Traditional research has searched primarily for cures, but Epstein,
pointing to the very modest increase in survival rates that research has achieved, contends that "there has been little overall
improvement in our ability to treat and cure most cancers" (p.
328). Researchers could better spend their energy, Epstein there-
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fore suggests, in trying to prevent cancer in the first place: research into the causes of cancer, through animal tests and epidemiological studies, would further the ability to eliminate the
many carcinogens that man places in the environment.
Fourth, Epstein devotes an entire chapter to outlining how
industry can improve its production of and response to research
and data. Most benefit and risk data come from industry, and
those data are often flawed. Academic researchers hired by industry as consultants are often biased, and industry will emphasize
favorable results even from poorly conducted studies while ignoring unfavorable conclusions from better studies. If tests on animals suggest a chemical is a carcinogen, industry claims that only
tests on humans are meaningful, yet industry loudly proclaims
negative carcinogenic findings from animal tests.
The answer lies not, says Epstein, in having industry build
more elaborate carcinogenic testing facilities. Nor will the agencies' current practice of formalizing guidelines and inspections,
improving audits and licensing, and increasing fines for manipulating or suppressing data alleviate the inherent conflict of interest industry confronts when made to test the carcinogenicity of
its products. Rather, Congress should set a buffer between the
researcher and the manufacturer. A disinterested advisory group,
Epstein believes, should receive requests from manufacturers for
testing a chemical and should distribute research contracts
through competitive bids. After the study, the advisory group
should comment on the quality of the research and forward its
recommendations to the appropriate agency. Not only would the
public and industry benefit from improved research, but, argues
Epstein, industry would be protected from legal liability if the
tests did not predict a product's carcinogenicity.
The Politics of Cancer is an important book because it brings
together the scientific, political, and social ramifications of the
many types of cancers. It suffers, 'perhaps inevitably in so great
a task, from an inconsistent tone, one which ranges from that of
a detached scientist explaining the value and limitations of animal tests, through that of an academic decrying the distortion of
data and the misunderstanding of legitimate inference, to that of
an advocate castigating industry. for hammering the public with
propaganda and the President for weighing political expediency
against 300,000 deaths annually from tobacco. Perhaps the book's
most disturbing characteristic is its treatment of -industry as a
monolithic whole (as indicated by its use of the· singular form
"industry" to mean "private business" or "manufacturing com-
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panies"). Epstein's documentary evidence against many manufacturing firms is convincing, but perhaps would be more compelling if he did not assume that all industry acts in recalcitrant
unison to oppose cancer prevention.
Epstein, who is a medical doctor and a Professor of Occupational and Environmental Medicine at the School of Public
Health of the University of Illinois at the Medical Center, Chicago, is strongest in explaining medical research: his most detailed references in the thirty-eight pages of endnotes are from
medical literature. As an experienced member of advisory commissions and panels, Epstein also documents well the government's struggle to cope with technical and scientific material.
Thus, despite any flaws, Dr. Epstein's book will surely be a welcome and important influence on the politics of cancer.

